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Abstract. In public announcement logic it is assumed that all agents
pay attention (listen to/observe) to the announcement. Weaker observa-
tional conditions can be modelled in event (action) model logic. In this
work, we propose a version of public announcement logic wherein it is
encoded in the states of the epistemic model which agents pay attention
to the announcement. This logic is called attention-based announcement
logic, abbreviated ABAL. We give an axiomatization and prove that com-
plexity of satisfiability is the same as that of public announcement logic,
and therefore lower than that of action model logic [2]. We exploit our
logic to formalize the concept of joint attention that has been widely
discussed in the philosophical and cognitive science literature. Finally,
we extend our logic by integrating attention change.
1 Introduction
In public announcement logic it is assumed that announcements are perceived by
all agents: it models the consequences of each of the agents incorporating a new
formula into the set of beliefs. The argument of the dynamic modal operator
in public announcement logic is therefore called an announcement. Once the
government has announced a new election, they cannot be held liable when you
forget to vote on election day. You were supposed to know.
In this work we take one step back from that point of view. When an an-
nouncement is made, it may well be that some agents were not paying attention
and therefore did not hear it. Also, there may be uncertainty among the agents
about who is paying attention and who not, and therefore, who heard the mes-
sage and who not. Contrarily to action model logic, in our modelling it is not an
aspect of the description of the action to which subset of all agents the announce-
ment is made, but this is now an aspect of the state in which the announcement
is executed.
Additional to the usual set of propositional variables we add designated vari-
ables for each agent, that express that the agent is paying attention. A given
state of a Kripke model therefore contains information about which agents are
paying attention and which agents are not paying attention. This determines
the meaning of what we call attention-based announcements. A special case is
that of introspective agents that know whether they are paying attention. We
axiomatize our attention-based announcement logic ABAL, including a version
with introspection for beliefs and attention.
An announcement by an outside observer that is public for a subset of all
agents is modelled in [9,6] as a private announcement to that subset of agents.
The agents’ attention configuration behind such announcements can be modelled
in our logic by a particular formula built from our attention variables. Our logic
generalizes Gerbrandy’s because the ‘attention level’ of a given agent can vary
between the states. Our logic can in turn be mapped to action model logic: each
configuration of attention corresponds to a particular class of action models.
We show that the complexity of satisfiability in our logic remains in the same
range as that of public announcement logic, viz. PSPACE. This contrasts with
the higher complexity of action model logic. As the action models corresponding
to attention-based announcements can be quite large, we consider that this is
indeed a valuable result.
In the ABAL we can formalize a concept that has been widely discussed in
the philosophical and in the cognitive science literature, namely joint attention
[15,13,7]. This concept has been shown to be crucial for explaining the genesis
of common belief in a group of agents.
Finally, we add other dynamics to our logic, namely change of attention. This
is an elementary further addition to the logical framework and this logic also
has a complete axiomatization.
2 Attention-Based Announcement Logic ABAL
Let AGT be a finite set of agents, let ATM be a (disjoint) countable set of propo-
sitional variables, and let H = {ha | a ∈ AGT} be a disjoint set of propositional
variables. A proposition ha (for ‘a is hearing what is being said’ or more simply
‘a is listening’ ) expresses that agent a is paying attention and so will hear public
announcements.
Definition 1 (Language). The language L of attention-based announcement
logic ABAL is defined as follows, where p ∈ ATM and a ∈ AGT.
L ∋ ϕ ::= p | ha | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | Baϕ | [ϕ]ϕ
We abbreviate
∧
a∈A ha by hA.
We write q to denote a variable that is either p ∈ ATM or ha ∈ H . Other propo-
sitional connectives, and the dual modalities, are defined as usual. Formula Baϕ
is read as ‘agent a believes that ϕ is true’, and formula [ϕ]ψ as ‘after the public
announcement of ϕ, ψ holds’.
Definition 2 (Epistemic attention model). An epistemic attention model
is a triple M = (S,R, V ) with S a non-empty set, R a function assigning to each
agent an accessibility relation Ra and V a function assigning to each proposi-
tional variable q ∈ ATM ∪ H the subset V (q) ⊆ S where the variable is true.
Definition 3 (Attention introspection). Given an epistemic attention model
M = (S,R, V ), the model satisfies the property of attention introspection if for
all s, t ∈ S, if (s, t) ∈ Ra, then s ∈ V (ha) iff t ∈ V (ha).
When attention introspection holds, an agent knows whether she is paying
attention.
Boolean constructions as well as operators of belief Ba are interpreted in
the standard way. The truth condition for attention-based announcements [ϕ] is
different from that of (world eliminating) truthful public announcement [14] and
also different from that of (arrow eliminating) public announcement [9], although
it comes closer to the latter in spirit: it is also arrow eliminating.
Definition 4 (Semantics of attention-based announcements)
M, s |= [ϕ]ψ iff Mϕ, (s, 0) |= ψ
where Mϕ = (S′, R′, V ′) is defined as follows.
– S′ = S × {0, 1}
– for each agent a, ((s, i), (t, j)) ∈ R′a if and only if (s, t) ∈ Ra and:
1. i = 0, j = 0, (M, s) |= ha and (M, t) |= ϕ, or
2. i = 0, j = 1, and (M, s) 6|= ha, or
3. i = 1, j = 1.
– for each p ∈ ATM, (s, 0) ∈ V ′(p) iff s ∈ V (p) and (s, 1) ∈ V ′(p) iff s ∈ V (p).
The model Mϕ is the extended disjoint union of the (arrows to) ϕ restriction of
M , called M |ϕ, and M itself, plus — that is the extension — a number of addi-
tional accessibility pairs between states for those agents that are not attentive.
Roughly speaking,Mϕ =M |ϕ⊕M plus some edges. After the announcement of
ϕ, the agents that are attentive only consider possible the 0-copies of the states
of the original model M in which ϕ is true. In contrast, the agents that are not
attentive only consider possible 1-copies of the states of the original model M .
This construction of the updated model Mϕ ensures that attentive agents learn
ϕ while inattentive agents don’t learn anything.
Example 1. Ann (a) and Bill (b) have lunch in the cafeteria and each consider
the possibility of snowfall this afternoon (p) — a regular occurrence in Nancy,
many times of the year. In fact Bill has seen the weather report and knows
whether it will snow, while Ann does not. However, Bill never knows whether
Ann is paying attention. Ann knows that Bill is attentive. Both agents know
whether they are attentive. This situation is depicted as model M in Fig. 1
(there is no particular actual state: any of the four may do.) Now Cath comes
along and says she just read the weather report: it will snow. This results in the
model transition depicted in Figure 1, where Cath’s announcement is modelled
as an announcement by an outsider. Any of the four points in M |p can be the
actual state of the resulting model, but not any of the M copy on the right hand
side. If Ann and Bill pay attention and p is true, as on the bottom-left side of
M |p, Bill remains uncertain if Ann now knows that p, as he considers it possible
that she was not paying attention (top-left of M |p), in which case she would
have remained uncertain about p.
Proposition 1 (Preservation of attention introspection). If M satisfies
attention introspection then Mϕ satisfies attention introspection.
Although we consider Prop. 1 a valuable result, it takes somewhat away from
the glamour when we realize that models with empty accessibility relations also
satisfy attention introspection. For example, suppose that agent a is paying at-
tention in the actual state s (ha is true) and also in the (uniquely) accessible
state t, and where s is also considered possible. Attention introspection is satis-
fied. After the announcement with attentive agents ¬ha, the agent a no longer
considers state t possible but also no longer considers the actual state possible.
Because the agent was paying attention, she has come to believe that she is
not paying attention; but at the price of still also believing that she is paying
attention — where the latter remains in fact the truth.
In this paper we focus on two classes of models: Kn, where n = |AGT|, that is,
multiple agents and no special properties of the accessibility relations, and K45hn,
that is, multiple agents with transitive and Euclidean accessibility relations, and
with attention introspection as well. (The classes S5hn and KD45
h
n are unsuitable:
they are not closed under announcements because the property of seriality (D)
may be lost after an announcement.) The set of valid L-formulas on the class of
models Kn is called ABAL, and the set of valid L formulas on the class of models
K45
h
n is called ABAL
intro.
3 Relation with Action Models
Every attention-based announcement is definable as an action model. Whether
an announcement ϕ is heard in a given state depends on the value of ha for
every agent a in that state. The agents who hear the announcement retain all
arrows pointing to states where ϕ holds and delete all arrows pointing to states
where ϕ does not hold, and that is independent of the truth of ϕ in the actual
state; whereas the agents who do not hear the announcement think that nothing
has happened, i.e., also independent of the truth of ϕ they think that the trivial
action with precondition ⊤ happened. There is an economic way to define such
an action model (in the sense of producing a resulting model with a minimal
duplication of states into bisimilar states). Definition 5 spells out the inductive
clause for attention-based announcement of an obviously inductively defined
translation.
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Fig. 1. Example of an attention-based announcement
Definition 5 (Action model for attention-based announcements). Given
a formula ϕ, the action model for the attention-based announcement of ϕ is the
multi-pointed action model Aϕ = (A, R, Pre, P ) where:
– A = {(i, J) | i ∈ {0, 1} and J ⊆ AGT} ∪ {w⊤};
– R maps each agent a ∈ AGT to
Ra = {((i, J), (1, K)) | i ∈ {0, 1} and a ∈ J} ∪
{((i, J), w⊤) | a 6∈ J} ∪ {(w⊤, w⊤)};
– Pre : A→ L is defined as follows:
• Pre((i, J)) = ϕ ∧
∧
a∈AGT ha where ϕ is either ϕ if i = 1 or ¬ϕ if i = 0
and ha is either ha if a ∈ J or ¬ha if a 6∈ J for all a ∈ AGT;
• Pre(w⊤) = ⊤;
– P = {(i, J) | i ∈ {0, 1} and J ⊆ AGT} is the set of points.
Informally, the action model for the attention-based announcement of ϕ consists
of 2n+1+1 actions and has 2n+1 initial points (alias actual actions). Each of
these points is identified by the complete and disjoint set of preconditions ϕ ∧∧
a∈AGT ha, where ϕ is either ϕ or ¬ϕ and where ha is either ha or ¬ha. Moreover,
there is a ‘nothing happens’ alternative with precondition ⊤, that is not an
initial point. An attentive agent believes that any action point with precondition
entailing ϕ may be the actual action. An inattentive agent believes that the
action with precondition ⊤ is the actual action.
The action model for attention-based announcements is depicted in Figure 2
for the example of two agents a and b and the announcement ϕ. For example,
if ϕ is false, ha is true, and hb is false, agent a hears the announcement ϕ and
believes it to be true, therefore she believes the real action to be the one where
ϕ is true — regardless of the values of ha and hb in states wherein it can be
executed (we take the case of general accessibility, i.e., logic Kn). So that makes
for four arrows. On the other hand, agent b does not hear the announcement
and believes that nothing at all happens: a single arrow to the alternative with
precondition ⊤ (and with reflexive arrows for a and b: b believes, incorrectly,
that all agents believe that nothing happened).
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¬ϕ,¬ha, hb
¬ϕ, ha,¬hb
¬ϕ, ha, hb
ϕ,¬ha,¬hb
ϕ,¬ha, hb
ϕ, ha,¬hb
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a, b
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b
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Fig. 2. The action model A corresponding to an attention-based announcements ϕ to
two agents. An arrow pointing to a box points to all actions in the box.
This action model construction maps nicely with the semantics of [ϕ]ψ that
given a model M produces a model Mϕ twice that size, consisting of a ‘trivial’
copy M plus a ‘heard’ copy M |ϕ. As all the 2n+1 different preconditions in the
action model are exclusive, the product of that entire part of the action model
produces a model of the same size as M , but with merely some removed arrows.
A recursive translation defines an embedding from ABAL into action model logic.
Proposition 2. Let M be an epistemic attention model. Let Aϕ be the action
model (according to Def. 5) corresponding to ϕ. Then Mϕ ↔ M ⊗Aϕ.
4 Axiomatization and Complexity
Table 1 shows the axiomatization. It follows the pattern of believed announce-
ments (arrow eliminating), not that of truthful announcements (state eliminat-
ing). The crucial axiom is
[ϕ]Baψ ↔ ((ha → Ba(ϕ→ [ϕ]ψ)) ∧ (¬ha → Baψ))
It says that the belief consequences of an attention-based announcement are
either, if the agent pays attention, what the agent believes to be the consequences
of the announcement in case it was true, or else, if the agent does not pay
attention, what the belief consequences were before the announcement (i.e., an
agent not hearing the announcement does not change her beliefs). Note that our
axiom resembles Gerbrandy’s axiom for private announcements. The axioms *
formalize that agents have introspective beliefs and are not uncertain about what
they hear. (Attention introspection is therefore just like awareness introspection
in a the logic of awareness [8].) The axiomatization ABAL consists of all the
derivation rules and axioms of Table 1. The axiomatization ABALintro consists of
ABAL plus the *-ed axioms and rules. Soundness follows straightforwardly from
the action model modelling of attention-based announcements that we will give
in Section 3.
Table 1. The axiomatizations for ABAL and ABALintro
all propositional tautologies Baϕ→ BaBaϕ ∗
Ba(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Baϕ→ Baψ) ¬Baϕ→ Ba¬Baϕ ∗
[ϕ]Baψ ↔ ((ha → Ba(ϕ→ [ϕ]ψ)) ∧ (¬ha → Baψ)) ha → Baha ∗
[ϕ](ψ ∧ χ)↔ ([ϕ]ψ ∧ [ϕ]χ) ¬ha → Ba¬ha ∗
[ϕ]¬ψ ↔ ¬[ϕ]ψ From ϕ infer Baϕ
[ϕ]q ↔ q From ϕ infer [ψ]ϕ
Proposition 3. The axiomatization of ABAL is sound and complete for the
class of Kn models. The axiomatization of ABAL
intro is sound and complete for
the class of K45hn models.
Proof. The standard reduction argument applies: all axioms for the consequences
of announcements push the announcement operator deeper into the formula on
the right hand side, until one finally arrives at an announcement before a propo-
sitional variable, [ϕ]p, which is equivalent to p. Therefore the logic is equally
expressive to the base modal logic — which is complete.
We note that by Proposition 1 the belief modality of ABALintro does not col-
lapse into a knowledge modality; see [5] for an investigation of this issue.
In the remainder of the section we focus on the ABAL satisfiability problem on
the class of all Kn frames. The satisfiability problem of a formula in the language
of action model logic [6] plus the union operator over actions is NEXPTIME-
complete [2]. ABAL is the fragment of action model logic for an action model
of size exponential in the number of agents (see Section 3). So the satisfiability
problem of ABAL is decidable.
It is difficult to turn the tableau method for action model logic into a PSPACE
procedure because each node may contain an exponential amount of information
in the length of the input formula. Surprisingly, we can adapt the tableau method
of action model logic so that the amount of information in a node is polynomial
in the size of the input.
Proposition 4. Satisfiability of L formulas in the class of Kn models is
PSPACE-complete.
We leave open the complexity of satisfiability of formulas of the ABAL on
the class of K45hn models. We conjecture that it equals that of the underlying
epistemic logic, viz. PSPACE complete.
5 Joint Attention
The attention introspection axiom ha → Baha of ABALintro only guarantees
attention introspection for individuals, not for groups: it may happen that hA is
true while some a ∈ A does not believe that hA. We now investigate a condition
under which attention introspection obtains in terms of common belief: joint
attention or joint attentional state. That concept was widely discussed in the
philosophical and in the cognitive science literature [15,13,7], and we show that
it can be captured in our logic ABALintro.
We assume a common belief operator CA for a subgroup A of the set of all
agents, so that CAϕ stands for ‘the agents in group A commonly believe ϕ’, and
which is interpreted in the usual way by the transitive closure of the union of all
accessibility relations Ra for the agents in A.
Let A ⊆ AGT. The idea is that the agents in A have a joint attention (or
are in a joint attentional state) if and only if they are looking at the source of
information together, that is to say, every agent in A is looking at the source
of information, every agent in A believes that every agent in A is looking at
the source of information, and so on. More concisely, the agents in A are in a
joint attentional state if and only if each of them is looking at the source of
information and focusing his attention on it and they have common belief that
each of them is looking at the source of information and focusing his attention
on it. Formally:
JointAttA ≡def hA ∧CAhA.
Note that joint attention is closed under attention-based announcements: if
M, s |= JointAttA then Mϕ, s |= JointAttA for every ϕ such that M, s |= ϕ. Note
moreover that when joint attention of all agents is satisfied then attention-based
announcements are the same as public announcements.
As pointed out by [13,7], joint attention explains the genesis of common beliefs
in the context of social interaction. Such genesis is often considered as related
to public events in the sense that a common belief is either a consequence of
an event whose occurrence is so evident (viz. public) that agents cannot but
recognize it as when, during a soccer match, players mutually believe that they
are playing soccer, or the product of a communication process as when the ref-
eree publicly announces that one player is expelled. From there on each player
believes that each other player believes and so on that one of them has been
expelled. Intuitively, an event is considered public as long as its occurrence is
epistemically accessible by everybody such that it becomes common belief be-
tween them. But what are the intuitive conditions that make an event public?
What are the reasons to believe that an occurring event is commonly believed?
In a normal situation (what is announced is true, there is no noise in the commu-
nication channel, etc.) looking at the source of information and having a common
belief that everyone is looking at the source of information (i.e., being in a joint
attentional state) provide a sufficient condition for the formation of a common
belief. This is captured by a validity of ABAL (to avoid Moorean phenomena we
restrict ourselves to learning propositional variables):
|= JointAttA → [p]CAp (1)
We can actually characterize the formation of common belief of an atomic
fact p as follows:
|= [p]CAp↔ CA
∧
a∈A
(ha ∨Bap) (2)
Note that the equivalence is not valid if we replace p by ha.
6 Attention Change
A good way to have your addressees pay attention is to clap your hands before
making an announcement. Even if they were not paying attention, they now do.
In other words, if ¬ha was true before, ha is true now. And this is the case for
all agents. This is a public way to make everybody pay attention to you. Even
more, you have achieved their joint attention.
A less public way to make someone listen to you is to tap on her shoulder
before you speak. This only makes that person attentive and not the other
agents. Suppose that agents a and b are both not paying attention. If I tap on
a’s shoulder and then say something, only a and not b will hear it. If, on the
other hand, I first tap a’s shoulder and then b’s then both a and b will hear
the announcement, but they consider it possible that the other was not paying
attention and does not hear it. The order does not make a difference. In contrast,
clapping your hands is a way to ensure joint attention.
Drawing inspiration from [17,16], we model such fine-grained attention change
by an assignment. Given a set of agents A ⊆ AGT, we distinguish the assignment
+A (merely shorthand for a simultaneous assignment a1 := ⊤, . . . , an := ⊤) that
makes all agents a ∈ A pay attention and hear subsequent announcements, from
an assignment −A that makes all ha false. To the inductive definition of the
language L (Def. 1) we add clauses for the modal operators [+A] and [−A], for
A ⊆ AGT. We write [+a1, . . . , an] instead of [+{a1, . . . , an}]. The semantics of
attention-based assignment is then:
M, s |= [+A]ψ iff M+A, (s, 0) |= ψ
M, s |= [−A]ψ iff M−A, (s, 0) |= ψ
where M+A = (S′, R′, V ′) is defined as follows (the definition of M−A is similar).
– S′ = S × {0, 1};
– if a ∈ A and s, t ∈ S then ((s, i), (t, j)) ∈ R′a iff (s, t) ∈ Ra and
1. (1) i=0 and j=0; or
2. (2) i=1 and j=1;
– if a 6∈ A and s, t ∈ S then ((s, i), (t, j)) ∈ R′a iff (s, t) ∈ Ra and
1. (1) i=0, j=0, and (M, s) |= ha; or
2. (2) i=0, j=1, and (M, s) 6|= ha; or
3. (3) i=1 and j=1;
– (s, 0) ∈ V ′(p) iff s ∈ V (p), and (s, 1) ∈ V ′(p) iff s ∈ V (p);
– if a ∈ A then
1. (s, 0) ∈ V ′(ha) iff s ∈ V (ha), and
2. (s, 1) ∈ V ′(ha) iff s ∈ V (ha);
– if a 6∈ A then
1. (s, 0) ∈ V ′(ha), and
2. (s, 1) ∈ V ′(ha) iff s ∈ V (ha).
In the case of the singleton attention assignment +a, agent a will now pay
attention in the 0-copy of the initial model and may or may not be paying
attention in the 1-copy (that copies the prior information state). If another
agent b was already paying attention he will now know that a is now paying
attention (the first item of the clause for agents not paying attention, above,
wherein arrows point to other 0-worlds); else his knowledge of a’s attention span
is as before (the second item of the clause for agents not paying attention). The
only factual information change takes place in the 0-copy, and only for ha (this
is the part (s, 0) ∈ V ′(ha) in the last item, i.e., for all states s in the 0-copy ha
is now true).
Attention assignment preserves attention introspection. The order in succes-
sive change of attention does not matter, but it does not achieve joint attention:
– |= [+a][+b]ϕ↔ [+b][+a]ϕ;
– 6|= [+a, b]ϕ↔ [+b][+a]ϕ.
Just as attention-based announcements, an attention assignment correspond
to an action model that is a function of (1) who is paying attention and who
not before the assignment, and (2) the assignment. The logic to which attention
assignment has been added can therefore also easily be axiomatized. (Details of
this action model are omitted.)
The validities of the language extended by assignments can be axiomatized by
means of reduction axioms for [+A] and [−A]. Separate axioms are needed for
all inductive cases [+A]ϕ (again, just as for attention-based announcement, as a
function of a rather complex action model). For the case of epistemic operators
these are:
[+A]Baϕ↔
{
Ba[+A]ϕ if a ∈ A
(ha → Ba[+A]ϕ) ∧ (¬ha → Baϕ) if a 6∈ A
[−A]Baϕ↔
{
Ba[−A]ϕ if a ∈ A
(ha → Ba[−A]ϕ) ∧ (¬ha → Baϕ) if a 6∈ A
Finally, let [[ϕ]]A be the modal operator of private announcement to group A
according to [9]. Then [[ϕ]]Aψ is equivalent to [+A][−A][ϕ]ψ, where A is AGT\A.
It follows that the public announcement of ϕ can be captured in our logic by
[+AGT][ϕ].
7 Comparison and Further Research
Our proposal is related to several other logics in the DEL literature: arrow
update logic [12], wherein a simple dynamic operator can have a large action
model equivalent; reasoning about perception [18]; reasoning about perceptual
beliefs [11]; reasoning about visually oriented agents [3]; action languages [1].
We plan to study the extension of attention-based announcement logic with
common belief that we have sketched in Section 5. On a similar setting we intend
to model trust-based announcement logic.
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Annex: Tableaux and Complexity
Let Lab be a countable set of labels designed to represent worlds of the epistemic
model (M,w). Our tableau method manipulates terms that we call tableau terms.
They are of the following kind:
– (σ Σ ϕ) where σ ∈ Lab is a symbol (that represents a world in the initial
model) and Σ is a sequence of formulas (where [] denotes the empty list).
This term means that ϕ is true after the announcements of the formulas of
the sequence Σ (in that order) in the world denoted by σ;
– (σ Σ !) means that the sequence Σ is executable in σ;
– (σ Σ ⊗) means that the sequence Σ is not executable in the world denoted
by σ;
– (σRaσ1) means that the world denoted by σ is linked by Ra to the world
denoted by σ1;
– ⊥ denotes an inconsistency.
A tableau rule is represented by a numerator N above a line and a finite list of
denominators D1, . . . ,Dk below this line, separated by vertical bars:
N
D1 | . . . | Dk
The numerator and the denominators are finite sets of tableau terms.
A tableau tree is a finite tree with a set of tableau terms at each node. A
rule with numerator N is applicable to a node carrying a set Γ , if Γ contains an
instance of N . If no rule is applicable, Γ is said to be saturated. We call a node
σ an end node, if the set of formulas Γ it carries is saturated or if ⊥ ∈ Γ . The
tableau tree is extended as follows:
1. Choose a leaf node n carrying Γ where n is not an end node, and choose a
rule ρ applicable to n.
2. (a) If ρ has only one denominator, add the appropriate instantiation to Γ .
(b) If ρ has k denominators with k>1, create k successor nodes for n, where
each successor i carries the union of Γ with an appropriate instantiation
of denominator Di.
A branch in a tableau tree is a path from the root to an end node. A branch
is closed if its end node contains ⊥, otherwise it is open. A tableau tree is closed
if all its branches are closed, otherwise it is open. The tableau tree for a formula
ϕ ∈ L is the tableau tree obtained from the root {(σ0 [] ϕ)} when all leaves are
end nodes.
The tableau rules are depicted in Figure 3. They contain the classical Boolean
rules (∧), (¬¬) and a non-deterministic rule (¬∧) handling disjunctions. The rule
(⊥) makes the current execution fail. The rules (←p) and (←¬p) correspond to
the fact that valuations are not changed by announcements. The rule (hear)
decides non-deterministically for all atomic propositions ha whether they are
true or false. Note that this is a non-analytic rule: the formulas in its denominator
are not necessarily subformulas of the input formula. Depending on the value of
ha, there are two versions of the rule for Ba and for ¬Ba. The rules (!), (⊗),
(clash ,⊗) and (ǫ⊗) deal with executability of the sequence Σ.
Proposition 5 (Soundness and Completeness of the Tableau Method).
A L formula ϕ is satisfiable iff there exists an open branch for ϕ.
Proof. ⇐ If the formula ϕ is satisfiable, there exists a pointed model (M,w)
such that M,w |= ϕ. We use the model M and the updated models from M
and the announcement in ϕ as an oracle to guide the execution of the tableau
method yielding to an open branch.
⇒ Given an open branch, we construct a model M where worlds are the
nodes σ, relations are inferred from terms of the form (σ Ra σ1) and valuations
are inferred from terms of the form (σ ǫ p) and (σ ǫ ¬p). We prove by induction
over Σ,ψ that (σ Σ ψ) is in the branch iff MΣ , σ |= ψ, where MΣ is the model
obtained by updating M by the sequence Σ.
Proposition 6. Satisfiability of L formulas in the class of Kn models is
PSPACE-complete.
Proof. As explained in [10], a tableau method leads to a PSPACE procedure
if we can apply the rules by only keeping in memory the content of a branch.
In our case the argument is essentially the same (see also [4]): we only keep in
memory the information concerning the current node and its path to the root
node, in order to be able to backtrack. We implicitly restrict the applicability
of the (hear) rule to those ha such that a occurs in the input formula. It is
PSPACE-hard because we may reduce polynomially the satisfiability problem
for Kn (the multi-agent version of the minimal modal logic K).
(σ Σ ϕ ∧ ψ)
(σ Σ ϕ)
(σ Σ ψ)
(∧) (σ Σ ¬¬ϕ)
(σ Σ ϕ)
(¬¬)
(σ Σ ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ))
(σ Σ ¬ϕ) | (σ Σ ¬ψ)
(¬∧)
(σ Σ p)(σ Σ ¬p)
⊥
(⊥)
(σ Σ [ϕ]ψ)
(σ Σ :: ϕ ψ)
([ϕ])
(σ Σ ¬[ϕ]ψ)
(σ Σ : ϕ ¬ψ)
(¬[ϕ])
(σ Σ p)
(σ [] p)
(←p)
(σ Σ ¬p)
(σ [] ¬p)
(←¬p)
(σ Σ :: ϕ !)
(σ Σ ϕ)
(σ Σ !)
(!)
(σ Σ :: ϕ ⊗)
(σ Σ !)
(σ Σ ¬ϕ)
(σ Σ ⊗)
(⊗)
(σ Σ ⊗)(σ Σ !)
⊥
(clash ,⊗)
(σ [] ⊗)
⊥
([]⊗)
(σ Σ Baϕ)(σ [] ha)
(σ Ra σ1)
(σ1 Σ !)
(σ1 Σ ϕ)
(σ1 Σ ⊗)
(Ba)
(σ Σ Baϕ)(σ [] ¬ha)
(σ Ra σ1)
(σ1 [] ϕ)
(Ba)
(σ [] ha)(σ Σ ¬Baϕ)
(σ Ra σnew)
(σnew Σ !)
(σnew Σ ¬ϕ)
(¬Ba) (σ [] ¬ha)(σ Σ ¬Baϕ)
(σ Ra σnew)
(σnew [] ¬ϕ)
(¬Ba)
(σ [] ha) (σ [] ¬ha)
(hear)
Fig. 3. Tableau rules
